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Recent studies suggest that democracy and globalization lead to ethnic hatred and 
violence in countries with a rich ethnic minority. We examine the thesis by Chua (2003) 
that democratization and globalization lead to ethnic violence in the presence of a 
market-dominant minority. We use different data sets to measure market dominant 
minorities and employ panel fixed effects regressions for a sample of 107 countries over 
the period 1984-2003. Our model contains two-way and three-way interactions to 
examine under which conditions democracy and globalization increase violence. We find 
no evidence for a worldwide Chua effect, but we do find support for Chua’s thesis for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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World on Fire? 
Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence  
 
“Economist progress in capitalist society means turmoil.” 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Amy Chua’s widely read ‘World on Fire’ (Chua, 2003) suggests that the current 
globalization and democratization waves are increasing ethnic violence in much of the 
developing world.1 While the book was both praised and criticized (see e.g. Glaeser, 
2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005), its claim has not received any support beyond 
anecdotal evidence.2 The aim of this paper is to examine the Chua thesis empirically. 
 The ‘Chua thesis’ is based on the observation that in many developing countries a 
small ethnic minority has a large economic advantage over the indigenous majority. 
Examples are the Chinese in South-east Asia, the Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in 
East Africa and whites in Latin America. As these minorities live by and benefit from 
‘the market’, Chua aptly labels them ‘market-dominant minorities’ (MDMs). MDMs 
typically control large parts of the economy so that globalizing markets favor them 
disproportionally. In turn, growing inequalities lead to resentment among the majority 
which, in democratic settings, cannot be contained by repression - or is even stimulated 
by office-seeking politicians (Glaeser, 2005). Chua’s main argument is that such 
resentment cause a violent backlash against the MDM, against markets and against 
democracy.  
Chua’s dismal scenario is particularly relevant given the strong democratization 
and globalization trends over the last two decades. Never before did so many countries in 
                                                
1
 See also Chua  (1995, 1998, 2000). 
2
 Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) purport to test the ‘Chua thesis’ and related ‘pundits’ claims’ (Rodrik and 
Wacziarg, 2005:50) but actually analyze whether transitions to democracy affect economic growth. We 
instead examine whether (the concurrence of) globalization and democracy affects ethnic violence levels, 
as claimed by Chua. 
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so few years switch from authoritarian to democratic polities (Jensen and Paldam, 2006). 
Furthermore, the second globalization wave gathered pace at a rate and scale which 
outranks the world’s first globalization era from the 1890s to the 1920s (Baldwin and 
Martin, 1999). While existing evidence suggests that both democracy and globalization 
tend to decrease conflict between countries (O’Neal and Russet, 2000), their relationship 
with internal conflict is less clear (Sambanis, 2002). Chua (2003) argues that where 
MDMs are present, the combination of democracy and globalization  constitutes a 
combustible mix. 
We examine the Chua thesis for a panel of 107 countries over the period 1984-2003. 
Our measure for the presence of an MDM is taken from the Minorities at Risk project 
(MAR, 2005), which we compare with an analysis based on a data set distilled from Chua 
(2003). We employ a fixed-effects panel estimator to focus on the variation of ethnic 
violence within countries. Our empirical framework includes two-way and three-way 
interaction effects to examine whether globalization and democracy affect ethnic violence 
in MDM countries. 
Previewing our results, we find partial but not global support for a Chua effect. In the 
full sample, neither democracy, nor globalization, nor a combination of both increase 
ethnic violence in MDM countries, defying a Chua effect. Instead, the results suggest that 
they do increase ethnic violence in non-MDM countries. However, if we include only 
Sub-Saharan African countries in the analysis, we do find strong evidence for a Chua 
effect. These findings survive a range of specification and robustness checks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
‘Chua thesis’ and relate it to the literature on civil conflict. In section III we present the 
data and our empirical framework. In Section IV we present our findings, while in section 
V we perform various sensitivity analyses and robustness checks. We conclude by 
reflecting on the merits and shortcomings of our study in section VI and suggest avenues 
for future research. 
 
 
II. The ‘Chua thesis’ and related literature 
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Chua argues that outbursts of ethnic violence in countries with an MDM result from the 
concurrence of democratization and globalization (Chua, 2003, p.16): “In the numerous 
countries around the world that have pervasive poverty and a market-dominant minority, 
democracy and markets – at least in the form in which they are currently being promoted 
– can proceed only in deep tension with each other. In such conditions, the combined 
pursuit of free markets and democratization has repeatedly catalyzed ethnic conflict in 
highly predictable ways, with catastrophic consequences, including genocidal violence 
and the subversion of markets and democracy themselves. This has been the sobering 
lesson of globalization over the last twenty years.” 
Her claim is illustrated with many case studies. One example is the position of the 
Chinese in Indonesia. With just 3 percent of Indonesia’s 200 million population, they are 
estimated to control around 70 percent of the private economy and - although not all rich 
– they are ‘economically dominant at every level of society’ (Chua, 2003:43). While 
Indonesia’s extraordinary economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s increased average 
incomes for all, the general perception among indigenous Indonesians was that it favored 
the Chinese disproportionally. They were seen as accumulating immense wealth 
supported by their ties to the Suharto regime. This massive, widespread hostility was 
suppressed by the regime but erupted after Indonesia became more democratic. Anti-
Chinese violence broke out in all the country’s major cities throughout 1998 (Chua, 
2003:45). This episode illustrates the Chua thesis well: Indonesia’s sequence of abundant 
globalization and growth followed by tentative democratization proved highly dangerous 
to its market-dominant minority. 
Two arguments underpin the ‘Chua thesis’.3 The first is that globalization and free 
markets breed domestic inequality along ethnic lines. The empirical evidence supports 
the view that globalization has been increasing domestic income inequality over the last 
thirty years (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). A second argument is that the introduction of 
democracy in countries with an MDM leads to ethnic hatred and, ultimately, ethnic 
violence. This relationship is studied by Glaeser (2005), who develops a model in which 
                                                
3
 One way to view the ‘Chua thesis’ is as a contemporary version of Huntington’s (1968) early work. He 
argued that resentment by those left behind in an economic growth episode would cause political instability 
unless restraining (often repressive) institutions were in place. Chua´s conjecture is more specific in that it 
posits that economically powerful ethnic minorities unwillingly act as focal points of resentment and 
attractors of violence. 
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politicians may have electoral motives to spread hatred against a rich minority. The 
willingness of rational voters to believe hate-creating stories depends on their incentives 
to learn about the truth. Incentives are weak particularly if there are high costs of 
interacting with the minority (due to, for instance, language or cultural differences) or 
low returns of interacting. Chua’s emphasis on the MDM being an ethnic group and 
active in (typically commercial and financial) sectors not normally accessed by the 
majority of the population (which is employed in agriculture) naturally fits in with this 
model. 
There is a already a large body of evidence on the determinants of civil conflict 
and instability – especially for Sub-Saharan Africa.4 Studies that examine the role of 
ethnic diversity are e.g. Easterly and Levine (1997), Collier (2001) and Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000). Furthermore, the effect of (changes in) democracy is studied by 
Sambanis (2001), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) and Hegre et al. (2001). Finally, Hegre 
et al. (2003) and Elbadawi and Hegre (2003) investigate whether globalization is related 
to conflict.5 Although some of these studies explore some interactions between different 
explanatory variables, the hypothesis by Chua (2003) has not been empirically examined.  
 
  
III. Method and Data 
To examine whether (the combination of) democracy and globalization affect(s) ethnic 
violence, we employ a panel data model with country and time specific fixed effects.6 
Time specific effects capture all variation in the data specific to some year, while country 
fixed effects are included to take account of all characteristics specific to each individual 
country (e.g., the degree of ethnic fractionalization or the institutional framework). As 
Chua’s thesis prescribes that democracy and globalization spark ethnic violence 
especially in MDM countries, we include two-way and three-way interaction effects to 
test her hypothesis. Our baseline model specification is: 
                                                
4
 A complete review can be found in Sambanis (2002). 
5
 Other studies that examine the impact of economic variables are Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004). 
6
 The inclusion of both country and time specific effects is based on different statistical tests. Hausman 
tests reject the null-hypothesis that the estimates of the fixed effects model are equal to the estimates of a 
random effects model. F-tests reject the null-hypotheses that all country and time specific effects are zero. 
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where yit is the dependent variable measuring violence resulting from ethnic tensions in 
country i in year t.  is a constant term, i denotes the country fixed effect of country i , t 
is the time specific effect of year t. GLit is an indicator measuring the degree of 
globalization in country i in year t. DEMit refers to our measure of democracy for country 
i in year t. MDMi denotes our dummy for a market dominant minority. The vector X 
contains a set of control variables suggested in previous studies on the determinants of  
civil conflict. In the remainder of this section we discuss our data in more detail. 
Chua (2003, p.6) defines an MDM as “an ethnic minority, who for widely varying 
reasons, tend under market conditions to dominate economically, often to a startling 
extent, the “indigenous” majorities around them.” An important aspect of this definition 
is ethnicity. According to Chua (2003, p. 14), ethnicity “.. refer[s] to a kind of group 
identification, a sense of belonging to a people, that is experienced “as a greatly 
extended form of kinship.” This definition of ethnicity is intended to be very broad, 
acknowledging the importance of subjective perceptions. It encompasses differences 
along racial lines, …, lines of geographic origin, …, as well as linguistic, religious, 
tribal, or other cultural lines.”  
Chua (2003) classifies 53 countries with an MDM and 45 countries without 
MDM. We list them in Appendix A. A drawback of the classification provided by Chua 
(2003) is that it is not clear whether a consistent MDM definition across country case 
studies is used. A second drawback is that Chua’s sample is based on unclear selection 
criteria. An analysis only on the basis of this classification might, therefore, be driven by 
a confirmation bias. Since these limitations preclude further data set expansion and call 
into question the validity of the data distilled from Chua (2003), we do not solely rely on 
this classification, but also consider an alternative source: the Minorities at Risk data set 
(MAR, 2005). 
The MAR project reports on the status of ethnic minorities within nation states. 
These are defined as ethno-political groups that collectively suffer or benefit from 
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systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or 
collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests. A minority is 
included in the data set if the country in which they reside has a population greater than 
500.000 and the minority has a population of at least 100.000 or one percent of the total 
population. 
 From this source we use the variable ecdifxx, which purports to measure the 
“economic difference between individual minority groups relative to the majority”.7 The 
variable ecdifxx is scaled from -2 (very advantageous position of the minority) to + 4 
(very disadvantageous position of the minority). The economic position of a minority is 
assessed over six dimensions: income level, ownership of land and other property, 
incidence of higher education and presence in commerce, the professions and official 
positions). For our purpose, we construct a dummy variable (labelled ‘MDM’) equal to 
one when there is at least one minority group within a country with an economically 
advantageous position (ecdifxx<0), and zero otherwise. Using this definition, there are 37 
countries with an MDM and 118 without an MDM. Country classifications according to 
the MAR data are listed in Appendix B. In table 1 we compare the classification distilled 
from Chua (2003) with the MDM variable from the MAR data.   
 
[insert table 1 here] 
 
The two MDM sources are similar but with noteworthy differences. They agree in 66 out 
of 98 cases (67%): in 44 cases both Chua (2003) and MAR indicate no MDM, while in 
22 cases both indicate the presence of an MDM8. But there are 31 MDMs in the Chua 
(2003) data not identified by the MAR data. Conversely, the MAR data identify the 
Berbers in Algeria to be market-dominant, but according to Chua (2003, p. 213) Algeria 
has no MDM. Since the MAR data set covers more countries than the Chua study and 
                                                
7
 See Minorites at Risk Project codebook (2005). 
8
 It should be noted that the consistency between the two classifications increases to 75% if all Latin 
American countries are excluded. Latin America’s economic elites tend to be of lighter skin (it is a 
‘pigmentocracy’), but their ethnic affiliation is unclear and they are mostly not listed as a minority in the 
MAR data. Another reason why the two sources differ is the size restriction included in the MAR criteria, 
while Chua (2003) also refers to very small groups that are economically dominant 
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uses transparent and consistent definitions, we use it in our main analysis below. To 
probe the robustness of our results, we also use the Chua (2003) data. 
 It is important to note here that the presence of an MDM is different from ethnic 
fractionalization, usually defined as the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belong to different groups (e.g. Alesina et. al, 2003). Even 
when fractionalization scores are low MDMs can be present, as in the case of Russia 
where a small number of tycoons of Jewish origin dominate economically (Chua, 2003).   
Conversely, the Central African Republic has no MDM, but scores high on all 
fractionalization measures.9 Moreover, MDMs are defined by ethnicity in general, while 
fractionalization measures differentiate between race, religion and language. The 
correlation coefficients in table 2 illustrate the difference between ethnic fractionalization 
and the concept of a market-dominant minority.10 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Our main democracy indicator is the widely used ‘polity2’ variable from the Polity IV 
project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). This variable ranges from -10 (very autocratic) to 
+10 (very democratic). As there are many different democracy indicators available in the 
literature (de Haan, 2007), we run auxiliary regressions with alternative democracy 
indicators to test the robustness of our results. These alternatives include the Gastil index, 
which is based on the level of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2006),  
and several ‘democracy’ dummies. The first is taken from Przeworski et al. (2000), who 
define a democracy as a regime that holds elections in which the opposition has some 
chance of winning and taking office. The second dummy is due to Vanhanen (2000), who 
defines democracies by a minimum level of political competition and electoral 
participation.11   
                                                
9
 The fractionalization scores for Russia and the Central African Republic (within brackets) are: ethnic 
fractionalization 0.25 (0.83), religious fractionalization 0.25 (0.83), language fractionalization 0.44 (0.79).   
10
 Furthermore, it also important to note that our MDM measure is different from the “ethnic dominance” 
variable as used by e.g. Collier (2001). “Ethnic dominance” refers to situations in which one ethnic group 
outnumbers other ethnic groups.   
11
 More specifically, democracies are polities in which at least 10% of the electorate votes and the largest 
political party receives not more than 70% of the votes. 
 9
 To proxy globalization, we use in our main analysis the KOF globalization index 
(Dreher, 2006), which is an aggregate index of economic, political and social 
globalization. We will also use its constitutive components in our robustness analysis.  
 To the best of our knowledge, there exists no source providing information on 
incidences (and intensity) of ethnic violence. Therefore, we use the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG, 2005) assessments of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions as a proxy 
for ethnic violence. The variable “internal conflicts” (scaled from 0 to 6) assesses 
political violence and is based on the occurrence of civil war, the threat of a coup d’etat, 
the incidence of terrorist acts and the extent of civil disorder in a country. The variable 
“ethnic tension” ranges from 0 to 12 and is an assessment of the degree of tension within 
a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.12 
Arguably, “internal conflicts” and” “ethnic tensions” are incomplete measures for 
ethnic violence. “Internal conflicts” may well capture more than only violence resulting 
from ethnic hatred. Conversely, ethnic tensions may not result in actual violence. A 
scatter plot of the two variables confirms that, in general, countries with severe ethnic 
tensions have more internal conflict, but also that the correlation is far from perfect. To 
proxy ethnic violence we therefore use the product of “ethnic tensions” and “internal 
conflicts” as our dependent variable.  
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
Although the ICRG data appear suitable, it is conceivable that these country assessments 
are biased. For example, a country with an MDM (or any other country characteristic) 
might receive a priori a higher score on ethnic tensions even though such tensions might 
not be present. To account for such a potential bias, we use fixed effects regressions to 
focus on the within variation of the data. Furthermore, it is possible that country 
assessments are influenced by a country’s past violence experience. To examine this 
possibility, it is necessary to differentiate between the potential bias in country 
assessments and the persistence in ethnic violence. Therefore, we regress the ethnic 
                                                
12
 In the ICRG data, higher values indicate lower levels of internal conflicts and ethnic tension, 
respectively. In our analysis, we multiplied each variable by -1 such that higher values imply higher level 
of conflict (or/and ethnic tension). 
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conflict variable on several objective violence indicators (also interacted with the ethnic 
fractionalization index of Alesina et al. (2003)) and compare it with a model that also 
include lags of the explanatory variables13 The r-squared values of both models are 0.80, 
which supports the view that additional lagged explanatory variables do not contribute 
much to current assessments of ethnic violence. Appendix C provides descriptive 
statistics of our data. 
 
 
IV. Estimation results 
Baseline estimation results are shown in table 3. In columns 1-3 we sequentially examine 
the one-way, two-way and three-way interaction effects of MDMs, democracy and 
globalization on ethnic violence using the MAR data as our MDM variable. In columns 
4-6 we follow the same procedure, but use the classification of Chua (2003). 
 
[insert table 3 here] 
 
The results using the classification of MAR and those obtained with the Chua data (2003) 
are very similar. In the first (and fourth) specification the coefficient on the level of 
democracy is insignificant, but all variables in specification 2-3 (and 5-6) are highly 
significant, with the exception of globalization in models (3) and (5).14 This implies that 
the effects of globalization and democracy are non-linear and interaction effects are 
present in the data. However, table 3 does not yet allow us to evaluate the implications of 
the Chua thesis; the estimated coefficients (and their standard errors) in interaction 
analysis are meaningless and have to be evaluated conditional on the other interacted 
variables, by calculating appropriate marginal effects (see Brambor et al, 2006). Before 
                                                
13
 These explanatory variables are based on actual incidences of violence and include: a civil war dummy 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002 and updates), dummies indicating the presence of small communal conflict and 
medium communal conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002 and updates), the number of guerrilla warfare attacks in a 
country, political revolutions, political assassinations and coups d’etat in a country (Banks 2005) and the 
number of deadly terrorist attacks in a country (MIPT, 2004). 
14
 We also ran the same regressions using ‘ethnic tensions’ and ‘internal conflicts’ as our dependent 
variable. The results of these regressions, which are available on request, were nearly identical to the results 
we present in tables 6 and 7 and therefore we use only the aggregate indicator in the remainder of the 
analysis.  
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we do so, we first account for a potential omitted variable bias by including different 
control variables that have been suggested in the literature. The results are shown in table 
4. 
 
[insert table 4 here]  
 
In columns 1-4 we add several economic variables to our model, i.e., GDP per capita, real 
GDP growth, the unemployment rate and inflation (all variables are taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators, 2005). Confirming earlier findings of the literature, we 
find that lower income, lower income growth and higher unemployment are significantly 
related to more ethnic violence. But, more importantly, the sign and significance of the 
variables of interest are unchanged. In column 5 we include a measure of wage inequality 
from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP, 2006), but its impact is 
insignificant. Next, we include a measure of corruption (ICRG, 2005) in the model as a 
proxy for weak governance. Although we focus on the within variation of the data, we 
find that this variable is highly significant. Finally, we examine whether ethnic violence 
is affected by regional ethnic conflicts. To do so, we follow the approach of Ades and 
Chua (1997), who construct an index for regional political instability. This index is a 
(weighted) average of the instability observed in country i’s neighbouring countries. In 
our case, we calculate this index for country i in year t on the basis of the ethnic violence 
scores observed in the neighbouring countries. The results shown in column 7 indicate 
that regional ethnic violence is strongly related to domestic ethnic violence. In column 8 
we add all significant control variables to the model. Unemployment and economic 
growth are now insignificant. Therefore, we exclude them in column 9, which is our 
preferred specification.15 We repeat this procedure using the MDM classification of Chua 
(2003). The last column shows the results of model specification 9, but now with the 
Chua (2003) MDM variable. It is (again) clear that the results are insensitive to the choice 
of MDM variable. 
                                                
15
 We have also done a general to specific model selection procedure in which we dropped the least 
significant variable until only significant variables remained. The outcome is identical to specification 9. 
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 To interpret our results, we plot the marginal effects (and their 95% confidence 
intervals) of democracy and globalization for MDM countries and non-MDM countries in 
figures 2 and 3, respectively.16  
 
[Insert figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
Figures 2a and 2b show that in MDM countries, democracy and globalization are not 
significantly related to ethnic violence. The effects of both variables do not depend on 
each other. In figure 3a and 3b the same plots are depicted, but now for non-MDM 
countries. As figure 3a shows, we now do find an interaction effect between globalization 
and democracy. Specifically, democracy increases ethnic violence once a country has a 
relatively high level of globalization. Again, we find largely no effect of globalization on 
ethnic violence – only for very autocratic countries globalization is just significant. On 
the basis of these results, we find no support for the Chua thesis. 
 
V. Robustness Analysis 
We subject our analysis to a large number of additional robustness and specification 
checks.17 First, we replace our democracy and globalization indices by a number of 
alternative measures. That is, we substitute the polity2 index with the measures of 
Vanhanen (2000), Przeworski et al. (2000) and the Freedomhouse (2006) and we replace 
the globalization index by the disaggregated measures (economic, political and social 
globalization) of globalization of Dreher (2006). None of these changes affects our 
results. Secondly, we consider an alternative approach to measure ethnic violence. We 
regard ethnic violence as a latent concept and use factor analysis on a number of violence 
                                                
16
 The figures are based on the results of column 9, table 4. 
17
 As explained in the previous section, the estimation results can only be interpreted conditional on the 
other covariates. Therefore, we opt not to present a table with estimation results. Furthermore, we only 
show the marginal effect plots when the alternative estimation results are substantially different from the 
results of figure 2a and 2b. All results are available on request. 
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indicators as well as the individual ICRG measures.18 The correlation between our 
preferred index and the factor score is 0.77. Our results are unaffected.19 
 Theoretically, it is possible that our results suffer from attrition bias, i.e., a 
number of ethnically divided countries (e.g. Yugoslavia) dropped from the sample and 
have become ethnically more homogenous countries (e.g. Slovenia). If we focus on a 
sample of countries for which we have data throughout the entire time period (89 
countries, N=1708), we find that attrition bias is not driving our results. 
 We further examine the robustness of our results using alternative estimation 
techniques. First, we employ panel corrected and autocorrelated standard errors to 
account for possible time dependency in the data.  Next, we estimate the model using a 
different robust estimators. We use the robust regression routine of Stata 9.2, which is 
based on iteratively least squares (Huber and Tukey bi-weight functions). Furthermore, 
we also use the Least Trimmed Squares estimator by Rousseeuw (1985). We conclude 
that our results are not driven by time dependence or outliers in the data.  
We also estimate the model for different sub-samples to explore sample 
heterogeneity. First, we focus on a sub-sample in which we exclude all OECD countries, 
since these countries have been almost always stable democracies and (apart from 
Mexico) do not have an MDM. Omission of these countries does not affect our results. 
Next, we focus only on Sub-Saharan African countries as this continent is most often 
associated with ethnic disparities. As shown in figures 4 and 5,  the results do change for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure a shows that democracy increases ethnic violence in MDM 
countries and the effect is larger for high levels of globalization. In addition, 
globalization decreases ethnic violence in autocratic countries, but the effect becomes 
positive (but insignificant) for higher values of democracy. We find the opposite effect of 
democracy in non MDM countries (figure 5a), i.e., democracy decreases ethnic violence 
in these countries – especially for high levels of globalization. Finally, figure 5b shows 
                                                
18
 Besides the ICRG assessments, we used the same violence indicators as mentioned in section 3. See 
footnote 13. 
19
 We also run the analysis using (only) the civil war dummy as dependent variable. Again the results were 
very similar to our main results.  
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that in non MDM countries globalization increases ethnic violence. The results for Sub-
Saharan Africa largely support the Chua thesis.20      
    
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Why have many developing countries witnessed outbreaks of excessive ethnic violence? 
Chua (2003) suggested the root cause is the concurrence of globalizing markets and 
increasing democracy in countries where a small ethnic minority economically dominates 
the indigenous majority. In this paper we empirically examine the Chua thesis. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, in Chua’s thesis, a 
crucial role is devoted to market-dominant minorities. We use different sources to 
identify these minorities and find that there are substantial differences with conventional 
measures of ethnic fractionalization. Our second contribution is that we focus on the 
interaction of ethnic differences, democracy and globalization. This is in contrast to the 
existing literature which has mainly focused on the direct impact of these variables.  
 On the basis of our empirical analysis we conclude that there is no 
evidence for a worldwide Chua effect. However, when we focus on the region which is 
currently most infamous for its ethnic violence, we do find strong evidence. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, democracy sparks ethnic conflict and the effect increases as countries in 
the region are more globalized. Importantly, we find that democracy decreases ethnic 
conflict when market-dominant minorities are absent. We conclude that these market 
dominant minorities are the crucial moderators responsible for the combustible effect of 
democracy plus globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The question why this region is 
different from the rest of the world is left for further research. 
Another finding is that the combination of democracy and globalization does 
robustly increase ethnic violence in countries without a market-dominant minorities. This 
suggests that Chua was right for the wrong reasons. “Exporting democracy and free 
markets” indeed “breeds ethnic hatred” (as the subtitle of Chua (2003) states), but 
market-dominant minorities are not a sufficient nor a necessary condition.   
                                                
20
 Using the same robustness checks as discussed earlier in this section, the results for the Sub-Saharan sub-
sample turn out to be robust. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Cross tabular of MDM classification Chua (2003) with MAR (2005) data. 
    Chua (2003)   
      
  
MDM no yes Total 
MAR (2005) no 44 31 75 
  
yes 1 22 23 
  
 
   
  
Total 45 53 98 
Sources: Chua (2003), Minorities at Risk project (2005). 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between  MDM and fractionalization measures. 
  MDM MDM 
  MAR (2005) Chua (2003) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0,27 0,51 
Religious fractionalization 0,22 0,14 
Language fractionalization 0,32 0,46 
N 149 95 
Sources: Chua (2003), Minorities at Risk project and Alesina et. al (2003). 
Table 3. Estimation results baseline model. 
Dependent variable: ethnic violence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MDM variable: MAR MAR MAR Chua Chua Chua 
GL 10.514 3.895 1.417 11.882 2.826 -4.655 
 (7.64)*** (2.18)** (0.76) (7.57)*** (1.41) (2.10)** 
DEM 0.021 -1.354 -1.746 0.135 -2.485 -3.786 
 (0.28) (7.01)*** (7.97)*** (1.41) (7.72)*** (10.59)*** 
MDM*GL  -10.723 -7.288  -4.511 4.506 
  (5.66)*** (3.75)***  (2.75)*** (2.18)** 
DEM*GL  0.679 0.962  0.875 1.721 
  (6.23)*** (7.49)***  (7.78)*** (11.05)*** 
MDM*DEM  1.282 2.877  1.579 3.692 
  (9.67)*** (9.49)***  (5.71)*** (9.01)*** 
MDM*DEM*GL   -1.164   -1.411 
   (5.94)***   (6.86)*** 
Observations 1991 1991 1991 1563 1563 1563 
Countries 107 107 107 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.30 0.35 0.36 
F-test country fixed effects, prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test time fixed effects, prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ramsey Reset test prob > F 0.45 0.07 0.14 0.83 0.33 0.95 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a constant and country and time specific effects (not shown). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. GL is the globalization variable. DEM refers to the democracy measure and MDM is 
the market-dominant minority dummy. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation results with additional control variables. 
Dependent variable: ethnic violence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
MDM variable: MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR chua 
GL 4.178 0.996 1.367 1.117 5.940 0.912 1.577 2.799 2.906 0.009 
 (2.19)** (0.54) (0.46) (0.60) (2.06)** (0.47) (0.86) (0.89) (1.51) (0.00) 
DEM -1.915 -1.754 -2.241 -1.760 -2.760 -1.722 -1.413 -1.602 -1.578 -2.614 
 (8.63)*** (8.02)*** (5.83)*** (8.06)*** (8.24)*** (7.25)*** (6.53)*** (3.59)*** (6.79)*** (6.65)*** 
MDM*GL -7.408 -6.882 -13.982 -6.799 -16.829 -7.594 -6.839 -12.685 -6.659 2.874 
 (3.80)*** (3.53)*** (4.48)*** (3.47)*** (3.61)*** (3.75)*** (3.48)*** (3.87)*** (3.21)*** (1.30) 
MDM*DEM 2.701 2.864 1.861 2.895 5.740 3.133 2.171 2.146 2.269 2.355 
 (8.95)*** (9.43)*** (2.36)** (9.54)*** (6.04)*** (9.84)*** (6.77)*** (2.62)*** (6.84)*** (5.38)*** 
DEM*GL 1.049 1.022 1.092 1.022 1.398 1.012 0.765 0.796 0.920 1.319 
 (7.87)*** (7.93)*** (5.21)*** (7.96)*** (7.25)*** (7.48)*** (5.88)*** (3.31)*** (6.74)*** (7.13)*** 
MDM*DEM*GL -1.057 -1.214 -0.667 -1.238 -2.710 -1.330 -0.781 -0.824 -0.857 -0.834 
 (5.25)*** (6.18)*** (1.45) (6.29)*** (4.09)*** (6.31)*** (3.78)*** (1.77)* (3.82)*** (3.73)*** 
ln(GDP per capita) -16.514       -11.753 -15.885 -16.549 
 (8.88)***       (3.37)*** (7.60)*** (6.59)*** 
Real GDP growth  -0.106      -0.073   
  (1.75)*      (0.80)   
Unemployment   0.464     0.147   
   (3.88)***     (1.22)   
Inflation    0.000       
    (1.29)       
Wage Inequality     -3.441      
     (0.29)      
Corruption      1.541  1.519 1.654 1.619 
      (8.08)***  (5.81)*** (8.87)*** (7.28)*** 
Regional ethnic violence       0.269 0.182 0.269 0.248 
       (8.70)*** (4.49)*** (8.88)*** (6.97)*** 
Observations 1957 1972 1173 1975 1026 1956 1991 1163 1922 1515 
Countries 106 107 94 107 95 107 107 94 106 79 
R-squared 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.43 
F-test fixed country effects, prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test fixed time effects, prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ramsey Reset test, prob >F 0.61 0.14 0.34 0.37 0.72 0.15 0.31 0.24 0.82 0.29 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a constant  and country and time specific effects (not shown). GL is the globalization 
variable. DEM refers to the democracy measure and MDM is the market-dominant minority dummy. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figure 1. Relationship (scatterplot) between internal conflict and ethnic tensions, 1984-
2003 
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Source: International Country Risk Guide (2005). Depicted are the average internal conflict scores and 
average ethnic tension scores. The period under consideration is 1984-2003. 
Figure 2a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound 
give the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 2b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound 
give the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 3a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy  in non- MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound 
give the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization  in non- MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound 
give the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 4a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in Sub-Saharan African 
MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of 
only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 4b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in Sub-Saharan African 
MDM countries. 
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
democracy
m
a
rg
in
a
l e
ffe
ct
lower bound marginal effect globalization upper bound
 
Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of 
only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 5a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in Sub-Saharan African non-
MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of 
only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 5b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in Sub-Saharan African 
non-MDM countries. 
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Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of 
only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval. 
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Appendix A. Countries with and without MDM according to Chua (2003) 
wdi Countries with MDM wdi Countries without 
BDI Burundi Tutsi ARE UAE 
BEN Benin Lebanese ARG Argentina 
BFA Burkina Faso Lebanese AUS Australia 
BHR Bahrain Sunni AUT Austria 
BOL Bolivia Whites BEL Belgium 
BRA Brazil Whites BWA Botswana 
CIV Cote d`Ivoire Lebanese CAN Canada 
CMR Cameroon Bamiléké CHE Switzerland 
COL Colombia "foreign born" CHL Chile 
CRI Costa Rica Whites CHN China 
ECU Ecuador Whites DEU Germany 
ETH Ethiopia Eritreans DNK Denmark 
FJI Fiji Indians DZA Algeria 
GHA Ghana Lebanese EGY Egypt 
GIN Guinea Lebanese, Susu ESP Spain 
GMB Gambia, The Lebanese FIN Finland 
GNB Guinea-Bissau Lebanese FRA France 
GTM Guatemala Whites GBR United Kingdom 
HUN Hungary Jews GRC Greece 
IDN Indonesia Chinese IND India 
IRQ Iraq Sunni, Bahat IRL Ireland 
KEN Kenya Whites, Indians, IRN Iran 
KHM Cambodia Chinese ITA Italy 
LAO Laos Chinese JOR Jordan 
LBN Lebanon Christians JPN Japan 
LBR Liberia Lebanese KOR Korea, Republic of 
LTU Lithuania Jews KWT Kuwait 
MEX Mexico Whites LBY Libya 
MLI Mali Lebanese LKA Sri Lanka 
MMR Myanmar (Burma) Chinese MAR Morocco 
MYS Malaysia Chinese NLD Netherlands 
NAM Namibia Whites NOR Norway 
NER Niger Lebanese NZL New Zealand 
NGA Nigeria Ibo, Lebanese OMN Oman 
PAK Pakistan Mohadjir PRT Portugal 
PAN Panama Jews QAT Qatar 
PER Peru Whites SAU Saudi Arabia 
PHL Philippines Chinese SDN Sudan 
POL Poland Jews SGP Singapore 
PRY Paraguay Whites SWE Sweden 
RUS Russia Jews TUN Tunisia 
RWA Rwanda Tutsi TUR Turkey 
SEN Senegal Lebanese URY Uruguay 
SLE Sierra Leone Lebanese USA United States 
SYR Syria Alowyte YEM Yemen 
TGO Togo Lebanese, Ewe   
THA Thailand Chinese   
TZA Tanzania Indians, Chagga   
UGA Uganda Indians, Baganda   
VEN Venezuela Whites   
ZAF South Africa Whites   
ZMB Zambia Indians   
ZWE Zimbabwe Whites     
Source: Chua (2003). 
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Appendix B. Countries with and without MDM according to MAR (2005) 
wdi Countries with MDM MDM 
AZE Azerbaijan Armenians, Russians 
BDI Burundi Tutsi 
BLR Belarus Russians 
CMR Cameroon Bamileke 
COG Congo, Republic of Lari 
DZA Algeria Berbers 
EST Estonia Russians 
FJI Fiji East Indians 
GEO Georgia Abkhazaians, Adzhars, Russians 
GHA Ghana Ewe 
GIN Guinea Susu 
GUY Guyana East Indians 
IDN Indonesia Chinese 
IRQ Iraq Kurds, Sunnis 
KAZ Kazakhstan Russians 
KEN Kenya Kalenjins 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Russians 
LBN Lebanon Maronite Christians, Sunnis 
MDG Madagascar Merina 
MLI Mali Mande 
MYS Malaysia Chinese 
NAM Namibia Europeans, Basters 
NER Niger Djerema-songhai 
NGA Nigeria Ibo 
PAK Pakistan Mohajirs 
RUS Russia Avars, Kumyks 
RWA Rwanda Tutsi 
TGO Togo Ewe, Kabre 
THA Thailand Chinese 
TJK Tajikistan Russians 
TKM Turkmenistan Russians 
UGA Uganda Ankole, Baganda 
UKR Ukraine Russians, Crimean Russians 
UZB Uzbekistan Russians 
ZAF South Africa Asians, Coloreds, Europeans, Zulus 
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. Luba, Hutus, Ngbandi, Tutsi 
ZWE Zimbabwe Europeans 
   
wdi Countries without MDM wdi Countries without MDM wdi Countries without MDM 
AFG Afghanistan ETH Ethiopia MUS Mauritius 
AGO Angola FIN Finland MWI Malawi 
ALB Albania FRA France NIC Nicaragua 
ARE UAE GAB Gabon NLD Netherlands 
ARG Argentina GBR United Kingdom NOR Norway 
ARM Armenia GMB Gambia, The NPL Nepal 
AUS Australia GNB Guinea-Bissau NZL New Zealand 
AUT Austria GRC Greece OMN Oman 
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BEL Belgium GTM Guatemala PAN Panama 
BEN Benin HND Honduras PER Peru 
BFA Burkina Faso HRV Croatia PHL Philippines 
BGD Bangladesh HTI Haiti PNG Papua New Guinea 
BGR Bulgaria HUN Hungary POL Poland 
BHR Bahrain IND India PRK Korea North 
BIH Bosnia IRL Ireland PRT Portugal 
BOL Bolivia IRN Iran PRY Paraguay 
BRA Brazil ISR Israel QAT Qatar 
BTN Bhutan ITA Italy ROM Romania 
BWA Botswana JAM Jamaica SAU Saudi Arabia 
CAF Central African Republic JOR Jordan SDN Sudan 
CAN Canada JPN Japan SEN Senegal 
CHE Switzerland KHM Cambodia SGP Singapore 
CHL Chile KOR Korea, Republic of SLE Sierra Leone 
CHN China KWT Kuwait SLV El Salvador 
CIV Cote d`Ivoire LAO Laos SOM Somalia 
COL Colombia LBR Liberia SVK Slovakia 
COM Comoros LBY Libya SVN Slovenia 
CRI Costa Rica LKA Sri Lanka SWE Sweden 
CUB Cuba LSO Lesotho SWZ Swaziland 
CYP Cyprus LTU Lithuania SYR Syria 
CZE Czech Republic LVA Latvia TCD Chad 
DEU Germany MAR Morocco TTO Trinidad &Tobago 
DJI Djibouti MDA Moldova TUN Tunisia 
DNK Denmark MEX Mexico TUR Turkey 
DOM Dominican Rep MKD Macedonia TZA Tanzania 
ECU Ecuador MMR Myanmar (Burma) URY Uruguay 
EGY Egypt MNG Mongolia USA United States 
ERI Eritrea MOZ Mozambique VEN Venezuela 
ESP Spain MRT Mauritania YEM Yemen 
 
Source: Minorities at Risk Project (2005) 
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Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable         N mean st. dev. min  max 
      
Violence      
Ethnic violence 2385 -35.67 20.48 -72 0 
Ethnic tensions 2385 -3.88 1.54 -6 0 
Internal conflict 2385 -8.47 2.85 -12 0 
Terror events 4850 3.45 17.41 0 536 
Deadly terror events 4850 1.18 6.53 0 216 
Guerilla warfare 4780 0.21 0.81 0 34 
Political revolutions 4780 0.21 0.54 0 9 
Civil war 4798 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Small communal conflict 4798 0.05 0.21 0 1 
      
Market dominant minority      
MDM (MAR, 2005) 4726 0.22 0.41 0 1 
MDM (Chua, 2003) 3289 0.54 0.50 0 1 
      
Globalization      
KOF globalization index (total) 3717 1.85 0.85 0.38 5.42 
Economic globalization 3479 3.01 1.11 0.64 6.15 
Political globalization 3717 1.76 1.04 0.00 5.72 
Social globalization 3717 0.84 0.88 0.01 6.25 
      
Democracy      
polity2 4760 0.23 7.56 -10 10 
polity dummy 4737 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Przeworsky et al. 4247 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Vanhanen 4301 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Freedomhouse 4569 -4.15 2.01 -7 -1 
      
Control variables      
ln GDP per capita 4284 7.37 1.57 4.03 10.88 
Real GDP growth 4323 1.36 6.38 -50.49 89.83 
Inflation 4323 61.66 616.03 -29.17 26762.02 
Wage inequality 2347 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.03 
Unemployment 1433 8.97 5.68 0.30 43.50 
Corruption 2384 -6.42 2.62 -12 -0.17 
 
